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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHER KHAN, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
PERRY ZOLEZZI, INC., 
Appellant. 
CASE NO. 7346 
/ 
Brief of Respondent 
This action was commenced by the filing of a 
complaint on April 18, 1947, setting up a cause of 
action against the defendant, W. R. Perry, upon a 
note executed by him to the plaintiff, and also 
against the corporate defendant for the payment of 
this indebtedness orthe defendant, W. R. Perry, upon 
the ground that the corporate defendant had assumed 
and agreed to pay this debt, and upon the further 
ground that the corporate defendant received prop-
erty in the amount of this note from the defendant 
Perry, upon an undertaking to apply the property 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pursuant to such· promise· and pay the property or 
money over to· the plaintiff. ·Plaintiff also alleged 
that pursuant to such promise, the corporate defen-
dant, on Sept. 21, 1946,- did pay $3,588.83 on this 
debt of $18,588.83, leaving a balance due of $15-
000.00. A writ of attachment was issued and real 
estate and personal property' of the def~ndant corpo-
ration was attached. 
The defendant corporation enter~d a general de-
nial and alleged that the sum of $3,588.83 was paid 
by the defendant, W. R. Perry without authority of 
the defendant corporation (R. 27). A plea alleging 
that the cause of action was barre9. by the provisions 
of 33-5-4, U.C.A. 1943 was also filed (R. 28). 
On Nov. 19, 1947, plaintiff filed an amendment 
to the complaint, adding a. second cause of action. 
This second caJ.Ise · of action· alleges a . sale by the de-
fendant, Perry, of all of his assets, otherwise than in 
the course of trade, and a failure of the purchaser to 
comply with the Bulk Sf!1les Act-Sec.· 33..:2-2-U.S.C. 
1943. (R 4~). The delict of the purchaser was .in 
failing to distribute the purchase price of the assets 
ratably to the creditors, in that all of the ·creditors 
of the individual defendant were paid in full, where-
as this creditor, the plaintiff, was paid only $3,588~83, 
upon a total obligation of $18,588.83~ This creditor 
was: paid approximately 19~.--o-f the amount of its 
claim, whereas all other creditors were paid 100%. 
Plaintiff alleged that assets of an agreed and reason-
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3 
able value of $192,809.90 were transferred by the de-
fendant, J?erry, to the corporate d~fendant, and at 
that time the liabilities of the defendant, Perry, in-
cluding $18,588.83, ·. owing to the plaintiff, were 
$142,809.90. The· sale price then was more than 
enough to pay all creditors 100% of the amount of 
their claims. 
The corporate defendant moved: 
"to dismiss the second cause of action, or in 
the alternative, to require plaintiff to elect be-
tween said alleged causes of action as to which 
of the same he will stand upon as a basis for 
his remedy, upon the ground and for the rea-
son that said alleged causes of action and the 
remedies sought are inconsistent in this, to-
wit: That the alleged first cause of action, 
by its tenns, seeks to enforce and secure the 
benefits for plaintiff of a purported contract, 
whereas under the alleged second cause of 
action said plaintiff seeks to repudiate, dis-
allow and declare null and void as to plaintiff 
the said transaction referred to in the. first 
cause of action." (R. 57) 
·The fact that the corporate defendant stated in 
its motion that the plaintiff was seeking to have the 
sale declared null and void 'as to the plaintiff,' should 
itself have brought to the attention of the corporate 
defendant the fact that there was no inconsistency 
between the first and second causes of action, in that 
both causes of action· acknowledge that the contract 
is valid as between buyer and seller, the second 
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cause of action only adding the entirely consistent 
allegation that as between the buyer and the seller's 
creditors, the contract, by force of statute, was null 
and void, a·nd by force of statute could be disre-· 
garded. · We shall discuss this feature later. · 
The action of the court in denying this motion 
to dismiss and in refusing to require the plaintiff to 
make the election of remedies is the basis of the cor-
porate defendant's First Assignment of Error (App. 
Br. p. 26). 
The corporate defendant then filed its answer 
to the second ca~se of action (R. 60). It pleaded as 
the second affirmative defense ( R. 65) : 
"That the plaintiff has by filing its first 
cause of action herein and by attaching the 
funds of this d~fendant corporation, elected to 
treat said _conveyance and transfer of property 
from defendant, W. R. Perry, to this defendant 
corporation as a valid conveyance and sale, 
and has elected his remedy herein." 
We mention the second affirmative defense be-
fore the first affirmative defense because the court 
having sustained a demurrer to the second affirma-
tive defense, the corporate defendant assigns that 
action of the court as error in its second specification 
of error (R. 26). The defendant here asserts that 
even though the court did not order an election of 
remedies, that the plaintiff by levying a writ of at-
tachment elected to treat the conveyance and trans• 
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fer ·of ·property from the defendant, Perry, to the de-
fendant corporation as a valid conveyance, and that 
plaintiff could not thereafter n1aii1tain the second 
cause of action. We shall discuss these two assign-
ments of error together, since they are essentially the 
~arne, both dealing with that phase of the law known 
as "Election of Remedies." 
The answer to the second cause of action also 
sets up a first affirmative defense, to-wit (R. 63): 
"That this defendant therefore verily 
and in good faith, believed that there were no 
obligations of said defendant, W. R. Perry, out-
standing and unpaid when it received from 
said defendant, W. R. Perry, a conveyance of 
said assets, and that there was no requirement 
on its part to comply with the provisions of 
Section 33-2-2 U.C.A. 1943." 
It also pleaded (R. 64): 
"That it _believed that said defendant, W. 
R. Perry, had fully paid and discharged, by 
payment, compromise or otherwise, all of the 
debts and obligations of the defendant, W. R. 
Perry; that by reason of said belief this defen-
-dant corporation transacted business and in-
curred obligations in its own name from the 
date of its incorporation to the date of the 
commencement of this action, in the belief 
that it,- this defendant, was obligated for obli-
gations created only by itself. That by reason 
thereof, .plaintiff is guilty of laches in attempt-
ing at this time to question the validity of said 
sale and assignment by defendant, W. R. Per-
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6 
ry, to this defendant, and plaintiff is estopped 
to question the validity thereof at this time." 
Defendant also pleaded as part of this affinna-
tive defense (R. 64) as follows: 
"Defendant is informed, verily believes 
and therefore alleges the fact to be, that the 
said plaintiff agreed with the said defendant, 
W. R. Perry,. that plaintiff would look to said 
defendant, W. R. Perry, for payment .of said 
obligation from his personal funds and would 
regard said obligation as a personal indebted-
ness of said defendant, W. R. Perry." 
It is notable that it is not pleaded that this agree-
ment was with the corporate defendant, or that 
there was an agreement releasing the corporate de-
fendant from this obligation, or that any agreement 
was made with the corporate defendant that the 
plaintiff would· waive the provisions of the Bulk 
Sales Act, enacted for the protection of creditors. 
The foregoing sets out the facts required as a 
preliminary to the argument to the corporate de-
fendant's Assignments of Error Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 6. 
None of these Assignments would have arrisen but 
for the addition of the Second Cause of Action; there-
fore, instead of arguing these Assignments now, we 
would prefer to discuss them when we get to the 
Second Cause of Action. 
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REPLY TO APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT ON FOURTH ASSIGNMENT 
OF ERROR (P. 43 Appellant's Brief) 
The Fourth Assignment of Error deals wholly 
with the First Cause of action. Defendant complains 
of the finding made that the defendant corporation 
assumed and agreed to pay this debt of the individual 
defendant and that it received property' from the 
individual defendant upon an undertaking to apply 
i1;· pursuant to such promise, to the payment of the 
debt owing by the individual defendant. Defendant 
also complains of the- finding of the subsidiary facts 
tending to prove these ultimate facts, these subsidi-
ary facts being that the corporation made entries on 
the books showing that it had assumed this· debt, 
and, secondly, that the corporation made a part pay-
ment of $3,588.83. We shall frrst disc~ss the fmding 
that the corporation assumed and agreed to pay this 
debt of the individual defendant, pointing out that 
this was done by the terms of Exhibit B, which was 
the pre-incorporation agreement executed by the 
two incorporators who owned 100% of the stock of 
the corporation. The writing, Exhibit B, meets the 
requirements of the Statute of Frauds. We shall also . 
undertake to show that Exhibits C, D, E and H meet 
the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. If this 
court concludes that these writings meet the require-
ments of the Statute of Frauds, then ·it would seem 
to be unnecessary to proceed further in this brief to 
establish the fact that the promise made by the de-
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fendant corporation to pay the debt of Sher "1\halrwas 
made by the defendant corporation which "has re~ 
ceived property of another upon an undertaking to 
apply it pursuant to· such promise." 
The bulk of this brief will be taken up by an ex-
position of the facts to demonstrate that the defen-
dant corporation received property from the individ-
ual defendant upon an undertaking· to apply that 
property to the payment of the debt of the individual 
defendant. Less discussion will be required to estab-
lish the subsidiary fact that -a part paYment of $3,-
588.83 was made by the defendant corpor~tion 
through its duly authorized officers and agents. 
EXHIBIT· B WAS THE PRE-INCORPORATION AGREEMENT WHICH 
BECAME BINDING UPON THE CORPORATION AND BY THE 
TERMS OF THAT AGREEMENT THE CORPORATION ·ASSUMED 
AND AGREED TO PAY THE DEBT OF PLAINTIFF 
Exhibit B states that W. R. Perry and one Ste-
phen Zolezzi were to form a corporation, the stock in 
which, after the conclusion of the transactions men-
tioned, were to be owned, in equal shares, by W. R. 
Perry and Stephen Zolezzi. The plan was that W. R. 
Perry was to acquire assets of the partnership·of Neil .. 
sen and Perry (W. R. Perry was· one partner) and 
that Perry would pay off the debts of the partner· 
ship and then contribute the, assets acquired from 
the partnership, together with.fuis own assets, to the 
corporation.. we here set forth those preliminary 
provisions in Exhibit B which are necessary to an 
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Understanding of that paragraph, subdivision (b) of 
Paragraph VIII, in which is found the promise to pay 
the debt of the defendant, Perry, to this plaintiff. 
These paragraphs are as follows: 
'.'V. 
The present liabilities which are owing 
by Neilson & Perry, a partnership, are repre-· 
sented by Mr. W. R. Perry to closely approxi-
mate the following: 
Due Pacific National Life Assurance Com-
pany $36,500.00. 
secured by first mortgage on plant and 
equipment 
Principal $35,000.00 
Accrued Interest $1,500.00 
Federal withholding and payroll taxes 
and property taxes 6,000 .. 00 
Sundry creditors for merchandise, con-
struction, services, etc. 60,500.00 
Unpaid drafts and contingent commit-
ments 61,000.00 
TOTAL $164,000.00" 
"VI. 
It is agreed that funds to meet the fore-
going liabilities, set forth in item ( 5) hereof, 
will be provided as follows: 
Proceeds of loan from First National Bank 
of Salt Lake City, to be secured by first 
mortgage on land, buildings and equip-
ment $80,000.00 
Cash to be provided by subscription of Mr. 
Zolezzi to stock of new corporation 
50,000.00 
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Cash to be contributed by Mr. PerrY di·· · · ................................. .. 
rectly to the First National Bank of Sal~ 
Lake City ,. 10,00Q.OO 
Turkey drafts presently owned by Mr. W. 
R. Perry which will be converted into 
cash currently and contributed to First 
National Bank by Mr. Perry 18,000.00 
Accounts Receivable and turkey inventory 
presently carried as partnership assets 
which are expected to be converted into 
cash to be delivered by Mr. Perry to 
First National Bank of Salt Lake City 
10~000.00 
TOTAL $168,000.00" 
"VIII 
Mr. Perry agrees that he will contribute 
to the new corporation, in exchange for can-
cellation of $40,000.00 of the $50,000.00 note 
given by him to the corporation and the is-
suance of 49,000 shares of the new corpora-
tion's $1.00 per share par value stock, the fol-
lowing properties: 
(a) His equity in the real property and 
improvements, which equity will 
consist of said properties valued at 
$135,000.00, subject to a first mort-
gage or deed of trust to secure the· 
payment of $80,000.00, liability for 
the payment of which obligation 
will be assumed by the new corp~ 
oration. Value of real property 
equity $55,000.00 
(b) Any cash remaining in the hands of 
the First National Bank of Salt Lake 
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1-1 
City, which remains out of the sum 
of $168,000.00 deposited under 
item (6) above, after the payment 
of other settlement of all of the lia-
bilities of the partnership amount-
ing to $164,000.00, per item (5). 
Minimum net cash expected to be 
contributed 4,000.00 
It is understood that the liability 
due Sher Khan, in the amount of 
$23,588.83, may be settled tempora-
rily by the payment of, say $5,-
000.00 in cash and the execution by 
Mr. Perry of a not~ for the balance 
of $18,588.83. In such event, the 
cash remaining in the hands of the 
First National Bank of Salt Lake 
City, to be transferred by Mr. Perry 
to the new corporation will be in-
creased by $18,588.83 and will be 
subject to the obligation incurred 
·by Mr. Perry in the same amount of 
$18,588.83. 
(c) Supplies and other prepayments 
presently recorded on · the partner-
ship books, having a book value in 
the approximate amount of $15,-
000.00, together with certain Ac-
counts Receivable, supplies and 
other assets presently owned by Mr. 
Perry in his own right closely ap-
proximating in value the amount of 
$15,000.00. Value of assets to be 
contributed $30,000.00· 
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(d) TOTAL OF ITEMS (a), (b) and 
(c) to be contributed by Mr. Perry 
$89,000.00 
In consideration of the transfer to the 
new corporation of the properties represented 
by (a), (b) and (c) herein in this item (8) 
set forth, the new corporation will cancel $40,~ 
000.00 of Mr. Perry's $50,000.00 n~te and issue 
Mr. Perry 49,000 shares of its $1.00 per share 
par value stock, as above indicated." 
The assumption of this debt is found in the sec-
ond paragraph of subdivision (b). It is true that the 
defendant corporation assumed payment of the debt 
- only if it received property in the amount of $18,-
588.83. As stated· in the introduction of this discus-
sion, it will be necessary to establish the fact that the 
defendant corporation received this sum of $18,-
588.83 and after that fact is established we shall set 
forth our position as to the applicable law that makes 
this pre-incorporation agreement the ~greement and 
writing of the corporation. 
THE CORPORATION RECEIVED FROM THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANT, 
PERRY, MORE THAN WAS REQUIRED BY THE FIRST PARAGRAPH 
OF SUBDIVISION B. IT ACTUALLY RECEIVED $18,599.83 MORE 
AS WAS CONTEMPLATED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE SECOND 
PARAGRAPH OF SUBDIVISION (b) of PARAGRAPH VIII 
. In paragraph V the liabilities of the partner-
ship were estimated as being $164,000.00 and para-
graph VI stated that $168,000.00 was to be provided 
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13 
from the sources stated in Paragraph VI to pay these 
debts of $164,000.00. This $4,000.00 overage was to 
be used by Perry, together with $85,000.00 more of 
Perry's assets to repay the $40,000.00 loan to the cor-
poration and to pay for 49,000 shares of the capital 
stock of the ·corporation. This agreement was drawn 
up~n the assumption that that amount of $4,000.00 
would be. available if the figures used in paragraphs 
V and VI were correct. However, the agreement it-
self recognized that these figures would be subject 
to change. In the second paragraph of subdivision 
(b) of Paragraph VIII, which we have quoted above, 
it was understood that the liability due Sher Khan, 
in the amount of $23,588.83 might be settled tempo-
rarily, by the payment of, say $5,000.00 in cash and 
the execution by Mr. Perry of a note for the balance 
of $18,588.83. As a matter of fact on the date of the 
execution of this agreement, namely, July 17, 1946, 
$5,000.00 had already been paid to Sher Khan and 
the balance of the account was $18,588.83 and a note 
had been given for that balance, and it was known 
that this note was not due until Dec. 1, 1946 and that 
this note would not be paid until the date it fell due. 
Though the estimated amount of the debts of $164,-
000.00 as stated in paragraph V included the account 
of Sher Khan in the amount of $23,588.83. (Exhibit 
F, -First page of Accounts Payble), and funds were 
going to be provided for the payment of the entire 
account due to Sher Kahn, upon the date of the ex-
ecution of this agreement, it was know that since this 
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debt to Sher Khan was not going to be paid immedi-
ately, there would be more than $4,000.00 available 
t<> the new corporation. The second paragraph of 
VIII (b) took note of this eventuality, stating: 
"In such event, the cash remaining in the 
hands of the First National Bank of Salt Lake 
City to be transferred by Mr. Perry to the new 
corporation will be increased by $18,588.83, 
and will be subject to the obligation incurred 
by Mr. Perry in the same amount of 18,-
588.83.'' 
It was then apparent that if assets of $168,000.00 
were provided to pay the debts of $164,000.00, less 
the $18,588.83 due to Sher Khan, there would be left 
an excess of $22,588.83, rather than an excess of only 
$4,000.00. The corporate defendant then agreed 
to this statement in paragraph VIII (b), that in con-
sideration of receiving that extra amount of $18,-
588.83, in cash or its equivalent, the cash remaining 
in its hands would be subject to the obligation in-
curred by Mr. Perry in the same amount of $18,-
588.83. 
The corporate defendant admits this in its brief, 
but the defendant argues <P. 48 of App. Brief) that 
the Promotion Agreement-Exhibit B, . 
"did not provide that the defendant corpora-
tion should assume the liability. Contends 
that the agreement provided only that if Per-
ry gave the corporation money equal to the 
Sher Khan debt that the corporation should 
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take the funds 'subject to' the obligation of 
Sher Khan. The most that can be said of such 
a provision would be that Perry might use 
corporate funds to pay the debt. This is vastly 
different from saying that the note becomes a 
company liability." 
Counsel for respondent must say that he is un-
able to see what is different about using the corporate 
defendant's funds to pay the debt from setting up this 
obligation as a company liability. Indeed, the corpora-
tion itself, upon its own books, with the acquiesence 
and consent of the company's bookkeeper, stockhold-
ers, auditors and officers set this amount up on the 
company's books as a liability. See Exhibit D, being 
a true copy of the joumal entry on the books of Per-
ry Zolezzi, Inc., taken from the General J oumal, 
page 3, lines 1 to 9. This entry records the personal 
property and assets taken over from W. R. Perry in 
August of 1946 at a value of $40,152.94, and shows 
the following contra-entries: 
That it records a liability to Sher Khan of $18,-
588.83 and gives Perry credit on his loan account of 
the difference of $21,564.11. It follows these entries 
with the following explanation: 
"To record receipt of assets ·and assump-
tion of liabilities of W. R. Perry." 
This is the company's own explanation of what 
is meant by taking over these assets and stating that 
it would take these assets over, subject to the obliga-
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tiori of the Sher Khan account. The company's own 
explanation is that it meant to, and did, assume the 
~bligation to pay Sher Khan. Exhibit C also states 
that the account of Sher Khan was assumed. by Perry 
Zollezzi, Inc., the corporate defendant. Exhibit H 
states: 
"We will not be able to pay Mr. Sher 
Khan on December 1st but we yvill be in a 
position to do so by January 1Oth." 
This Exhibit is signed by the company, albeit by W. 
R. Perry, as President of the company. 
Reference to these facts should dispel the state-
ments of counsel for appellant that no additional 
funds or property was received. Counsel for appel-
lant blandly state~ (App. Br. 49): 
"Mr. Duke, Perry's former employer and 
later Secretary of the company, testified that 
no such additional money was received by the 
company. It was a paper transaction." 
If counsel means by the words 'paper trans-
action' that the money or property was recorded on 
paper in the books of the company, he is correct. If 
he is using the term as being synonymous with a 
transaction with_out substance, he errs grossly. Mr. 
Duke testified to the contrary (R. 77): 
"Q. · (by Mr. Arnovitz) Mr. Duke, I show you 
Exibit G, which is the Account Receivable 
Account of W. R. Perry. I will ask you to 
refer to this record and tell us what bal-
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ance there was in favor of Mr. Perry as 
an amount owing to Mr. Perry as of 
August 6-no, well, as of this particular 
period here? 
A. As of the last day of August there was a 
credit balance due Mr. Perry of $4,310.40 . 
. Q. That was after setting up a credit for the 
account of Sher Khan, wasn't it? 
A. That same day, yes. 
Q. In other words, after showing payment of 
Sher Khan's account, Mr. Perry had con-
tributed more assets by $4,310.40. than 
the whole total of his debts were. Isn't 
that right, what that account shows? 
A. The account shows a credit balance. 
Q. As of what date? 
A. As of the last day of August." 
Appellant makes reckless statements that the 
action setting up this liability on Perry Zollezzi's 
books was some sort of fraud by the defendant, Per-
ry. (App. Br. 50 to 54, inc.) 
<R. 159) Mr. Duke was asked by attorneys for 
the appellant: 
"Q. Was any direction on the part of directors 
of the corporation in regard to its books 
taken into consideration at the time you 
set them up. 
A. No-in that we did transfer the exact 
balances of W. R. Perry, rather than-
we did have a copy of the minutes of the 
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first Board of Directors' meeting, which 
coincided-which figures coincided very 
closely with the figures on the books, but 
we transferred the actual book values.~' 
Exhibit I contains ~he minutes of the special 
meeting of the Board of Dir~ctors, and Mr. Duke ac-
knowledges that the figures stated in the minutes 
''coincided very closely with the figures on the 
books." (R. 161) 
Mr. Duke was asked: 
"Q. In regard to your opening entries in the 
journal whose language is used in those, 
in that journal, and who selected the 
language used in that journal? 
A. Mr. Evington of--
Q. Mr. Evington?" 
THE COURT. Though you may be clear, 
- just what was Mr. Evington's positj-on in 
this set-up? 
MR. RICH. He has testified, your Honor, 
he was a member of the firm of Wells, 
Baxter & Miller. · · 
THE COURT. A representative of that 
firm and that is the only capacity he ap-
peared in here in connection with this 
original transaction of setting up the 
books as a hired accountant? 
MR. ELTON. That is _right._ 
THE COURT. Hired by the new corpora-
ti. ? . on. 
MR. ARNOVITZ. _That is right. 
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mE COURT. Is that correct? 
MR. RICH. That is correct. 
MR. ELTON. That's right." 
As further evidence of the fact that the matter 
of setting up books was not done at th.~ direction of 
Mr. Perry, is found in the fact that when the accounts 
receivable belonging to Mr. Perry were taken over 
by the corporate· defendant they did fnot give Mr. 
Perry credit for all of his accounts receivable, but 
set up a reserve of $821.97 <R. 162 and 168). Surely 
if Mr. Perry had given the orders, the accounts re-
ceivable would have been taken over at their full 
face amount, rather than by setting up a reserve of 
$821.97. .J 
More than all this, the auditors sent to Salt 
Lake City by Mr. Zolezzi approved the values and 
had checked over the entries made on the books of 
the corporation (R. 155, 157). Mr. Pinska was an 
accountant and auditor who came to Salt Lake City 
with Mr. Zolezzi to examine the books of the corpo-
ration after they had been set up. After discussing 
that examination of the books by Mr. Pinska, the fol-
lowing evidence was given by Mr. Duke: (R. 157) 
"Q. But at any rate, after that examination, 
no change was made in the values of 
these assets as set up on the books of the 
company? 
A. No. 
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And there never has been a change made, 
has there, in the books of the company? 
No." 
This discussion of the First Cause of Action dem-
onstrated that the corporate defendant received $18,-
588.83, just as was contemplated by the eventuality 
mentioned in the second paragraph of subdivision 
(d) of paragraph VIII. We shall substantiate this by 
a series of schedules prepared from the exhibits in-
troduced into evidence. 
SUBSTANTIATION OF FACT THAT ASSETS OF $18,588.83 MORE 
THAN WAS NEEDED TO GIVE THE CORPORATION A NET WORTH 
OF $100,000.00 WAS RECEIVED BY THE CORPORATION AND THAT 
IN CONSIDERATION OF THE RECEIPT OF THAT SUM IT ASSUMED 
THIS OBLIGATION. THE ASSETS RECEIVED IN THIS AMOUNT OF 
$18,588.83 COMPENSATED FOR THE LIABILITY ASSUMED IN THE 
SAME AMOUNT, THE CORPORATION STILL HAVING A NET WORTH 
OF $1 00,000.00. 
The pre-incorporation agreement contemplated 
that so much of Perry's assets as would be needed to 
pay off the debts would be reduced to cash. Original-
ly it was thought that $164,000.00 in cash would be 
needed and that is why it was contemplated that cash 
would be available in the amount of $168,000.00, or 
$4,000.00 more than was necessary to pay the ex-
pected debts. However, the actual debts were only 
$142,809.90, and by deferring the Sher Khan debt 
the cash required to pay the remaining debts was 
$124,221.07. Thus the fund provided by the $80,-
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000.00 for Zolezzi's contribution to the capital stock 
was more than enough to pay this amount of $124,-
221.07. Hence it became unnecessary to reduce the 
other assets to cash, and, instead, the corporation 
took over Perry's assets at market value. Therefore 
the assets taken over would not result in their being 
$4,000.00 of actual cash or any amount of actual 
cash, but instead, the new corporation would have 
tangible assets which were t:Qe equivalent of $4,-
000.00 in cash. Whether the corporation would have 
had available in cash, or the equivalent thereof, only 
$4,000.00 after the payment of all the debts of Perry, 
including the debt to Sher Khan, as stated in the first 
paragraph of subdivision (d), or whether it would 
have had available in cash, or the equivalent of cash, 
$4,000.00, plus the $18,588.83, of which it was tem-
porarily deferring payment to Sher Khan, the end 
result sought to be obtained by the pre-incorporation 
agreement was accomplished. This end result sought 
to be obtained by the pre-incorporation agreement 
was that there was to be a net worth of $100,000.00 
in the new corporation upon its formation. (See par. 
IX of Exhibit B, which states: 
"After giving effect to the foregoing 
transactions the new corporation will com-
mence with a balance sheet substantially as 
follows:" (Then follows the balance sheet 
which we have inserted in the brief as "Sched-
ule 1-A. See page 52) 
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The balance sheet in Schedule 1A shows what 
the balance sheet of the new corporation was · re-
quired to look like if Perry had actually· ·paid the 
debt, including the Sher Khan debt. Although it was 
anticipated that the Sher Kahn debt might not be 
paid, a second balance sheet was not inserted in the 
exhibit to show what such a balance sheet would look 
like. To prove that in each case the same end result 
namely, a net worth of $100,000.00 is reached in both 
situations, we have prepared Schedule 1B (page 53). 
We stated above that the seller, Perry, and the 
buyer, the defendant corporation, estimated Perry's 
debts as $164,000.00, and that estimate included an 
account of Sher Khan in the amount of 23,588.83. 
This estimate of $164,000.00 was too high for several 
reasons. There had been paid a few days before this 
agreement was signed the sum of $5,000.00 to Sher 
Khan, and by going to his creditors Perry had secured 
a reduction in the amount of his debts so that the debts 
that he actually owed were $142,809.90. Therefore it 
was not necessary to provide a fund of $168,000.00 
in order to pay the debts and to have a remainder of 
$4,000.00 The amount necessary to accomplish this 
purpose was $146,809.90. The mortgage loan from 
the First National Bank of $80,000.00 and the $50,-
000.00 stock subscription of Zolezzi, provid~d $130,-
000.00, so only $16,809.90 additional was required. 
However, Perry had available assets of $56,-
16-3.33 in his old business. In order to pay for his 
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capital stock of $49,000.00 and to repay his loan as 
required in paragraph VIII, only $30,000.00 of per-
sonal property was required. The remaining $26,-
163.33 was also transferred to the corporation so that 
$9,353.43 more was paid into the corporation in per-
sonal property assets than was required. The plant 
and equipment values were $1,646.57 in ex<;ess of 
$135,000.00 required. Together these two items 
equal $11,000.00, and they were paid into the corpo-
ration in lieu of the $10,000.00 promissory note 
which Perry was going to contribute and the $1,-
000.00 in cash which Perry was going to pay in. 
Therefore, Perry contributed the exact amount of 
the property required of him_ by the agreement, and 
then when the payment of the Sher Khan account 
was deferred, the sum of $18,588.83 was left on hand 
in the hands of the corporation. 
The actual balance sheet of the corporation 
taken from the books of the company immediately 
after the corporation's books were Qpened shows that 
the corporation had a net worth of $100,000.00, even 
after setting up the Sher Khan debt as a liability c.tnd 
after setting up an additional liability to Mr. Perry 
of $4,310.40. If this sum of $4,310.40 had not been 
owing to Mr. Perry, individually, this balance sheet, 
Schedule 1 C would have shown the same balancing 
figure of $198,588.83. We point this out so it will 
not be thought there is any conflict between the bal-
ance sheets, Schedules 1B and 1C. The balancing 
figure in Schedule 1C is $202,899.23, including the 
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additional item of $4,310.40, and el~minating that 
item, it would have been $198,588.83, the same as in 
Schedule 1B. These three schedules are found in 
this brief at pages 52-54. 
Further proof of the fact that the corporation 
received $18,588.83 more than was contemplated is 
found in Exhibit L, prepared by Mr. Helwing, an 
auditor who appeared as witness for the plaintiff. 
This exhibit proves conclusively that not only $18,-
588.83 more than was necessary to pay the other 
debts and for the capital stock was actually turned 
over, but in fact, that the excess amount turned over 
amounted to $23,899.23, and after recording the as-
sumption of this liability of $18,588.83, and allowing 
for the $1,000.00 that had been thought necessary to 
pay for the last $1,000.00 worth of the capital stock 
there was still an excess amount of assets paid in by 
Mr. Perry of $4,310.40. 
Further proof of this same fact is found in Exhib-
it G, which is the "Accounts Receivable Account" of 
W. R. Perry on the books of the corporation. Line 10 
of that exhibit shows a credit balance in W. R. Per-
ry's account of $4,310.40, which means that Mr. 
Perry had actually paid that much more in assets 
than was required to pay all of Perry's debts, includ-
ing the debt of Sher Khan. It cannot therefore be 
stated that the corporation did not receive assets from 
Mr. Perry as consideration for its promise to pay this 
debt nor that it did not agree to pay the ol?ligation 
owing to the plaintiff. 
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THE PROVISIONS OF EXHIBIT 8, THE PRE-INCORPORATION AGREE-
MENT BECAME BINDING ON THE CORPORATION AND THEREFORE 
IS A SUFFICIENT WRITING TO MEET THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
After discussing these facts and making analy-
ses of these exhibits, we pass to the law to show that 
the written contract of W. R. Perry and Stephen 
Zolezzi became the writing of the corporation. The 
cases do not require that in order for a promotion 
agreement to be binding that the agreement be 
signed by the stockholders owning 100% of the capi-
tal stock. 
The only question is whether the corporation 
accepted the benefits of the contract. See Wall vs. 
Niagara Mining Company, 20 Utah 474; 59 Pac. 399. 
We quote the following from that case: 
"The most important question presented 
is whether 'promoters', or persons who con-
template organizing a corporation, can make 
contracts which will bind it after it becomes a 
legal entity. It is contended by counsel for 
the appellant that a contract made for a corp-
oration before it has an actual existence is not 
enforceable by or against it. This contention 
is too broad. It indicates that a corporation 
cannot, even in the exercise of its powers to 
make contracts, accept and adopt a contract 
made for it by the promoters before its exist-
ence as an entity. The legitimate sequence of 
this would be that a corporation, upon full and 
complete organization under the statute, 
might accept and adopt such a contract, re-
ceive and retain the benefits thereof, and at 
the same time be absolved from its burdens. 
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We have no sympathy with a doctrine that 
would lead to such results; that might be em-
ployed as an instrument of fraud and injustice 
to the unwary. It may be assumed as true 
that promoters and incorporators have no 
standing in any relation of agency, since that 
which has no existence can have no agent, 
and, in the absence of any act authorizing 
them so to do, can enter into no contract, nor 
transact any business, which shall bind the 
proposed corporation after it becomes a dis-
tinct entity; but, notwithstanding this be true, 
still such promoters and incorporators may, 
acting in their individual capacities, make con-
tracts·in furtherance of the incorporation, and 
for its benefit, and, after the incorporation 
comes into being as an artificial person under 
the forms of law, it may, at least under the 
weight of American authority, accept and 
adopt such contracts, and thereupon they be-
come its own contracts, and may be enforce by 
or against it. This the corporation may do, not 
because of an agency, on the part of the in-
corporators, before the existence of the entity, 
for there is none, but because of its own in.;. 
herent powers as a body corporate to make 
contracts. Moreover, the adoption of such a 
contract need not be by express action of the 
corporation, entered on its minutes, but may 
be inferred from its own acts and acquies-
cence, or those of its agents, and there need 
be no express acceptance; or the corporation 
may be bound by the contracts of its pro-
moters, if made so by its charter, which it has 
accepted and to which it was agreed. Unless, 
however, there be an acceptance and adoption 
thereof in some such way, the corporation will 
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not, in general, be bound by the contracts of 
its promoters and incorporators, made for it 
before its complete organization. Where a 
contract is made by and with promoters, 
which is intended to inure to the benefit of 
a corporation about to be organized, such con-
tract will be regarded as in the nature of an 
open offer, which the corporation, upon com-
plete organization, may accept and adopt or 
not, as it chooses; but, if it does accept and 
adopt and retain the benefits of it, it cannot 
reject any liability under it, but in such case 
will be bound to perform the contract, upon 
the principle that one who accepts and adopts 
a contract which another undertook to per-
form in his name and on his behalf must take 
the burden with the benefit. In Mor. Priv. Corp., 
548, it is said: 'A corporation may, however, 
make itself responsible for such acts and con-
tracts by subsequently adopting them. The 
liability of the corporation, under these cir-
cumstances, does not rest upon a supposed 
agency of the promoters, and a ratification of 
their acts, but upon the immediate and volun~ 
tary act of the company. If an agreement is 
made with promoters or persons about to form 
a corporation, and the parties intend that the 
corporation, when formed, shall become a 
party to the agreement, such agreement would 
usually constitute or include an open offer, 
which may be accepted by the corporation af-
ter it is formed. And this is true, whether the 
promoters are primarily liable or not.' So, in 
Tayl. Priv. Corp. 87, the author says: 'It may · 
be said, generally, that a corporation, when 
organized, in the absence of ratification on its 
part, is not responsible for the acts nor bound 
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by the contracts of its promoters, unless made 
so by its charter, which it has accepted and 
thereby agreed to. But this is not identical 
with the proposition that the corporation may 
ignore the engagements entered into by its 
promoters when it has had the benefit of them. 
It cannot be said that the promoters were the 
agents of the corporation, but, nevertheless, 
the corporation may adopt such acts of its 
promoters intended for its benefit, and may 
ratify such of their contracts made on its be-
half, as would have been within the powers of 
the corporation after its organization, and this 
it may do notwithstanding that it was not or-
ganized -when those contracts were made; and, 
if it ratifies their contracts, then, in the ab-
sence of express agreement with the other 
contracting party, the corporation must be 
held to have assumed the liabilities which 
would have attached to it had its promoters 
been its agents at the time when they con-
tracted on its behalf.' In Alger, Promoters 
Corp, 206, it wa~ said: 'The ~cceptance or 
adoption may be implied from the acts of the 
corporation, -'acts from which you can infer, 
and from which you ought to infer,' that there 
was an adoption of the contract by the corpo-
ration after its formation. This may be in-
ferred from the acceptance by the corporation 
of property directly delivered to it by the 
other party to the contract, or received from 
him through the promoters, to whom it was 
delivered to be turned over to the corporation 
when formed; or it may be inferred from the 
retention by the corporation of the benefit of 
services rendered under the contract subse-
quent, or ordinarily prior, to the formation 
of the corporation., " (Citing many cases.) 
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This case is followed by a more recent Utah 
case, Murray vs. Monter, 90 Utah 105; 60 Pac. (2) 
960 at 962: 
"The general rule of law is that promot-
ers who undertake to organize a corporation 
cannot bind the corporation by their contracts 
and agreements made before the corporation 
is organized. Tanner vs. Sinaloa Land & Fruit 
Co., 43 Utah 14, 134 Pac. 586, Ann. Cas. 
1916C, 100; Wall vs. Niagara Min. & S. Co. 20 
Utah, 474, 59 P. 399, 401; 1 Thompson on 
Corps. (3d Ed) 106; 4 Cook on Corps. (8th 
Ed) 707. But that the corporation after in-
corporation may accept and adopt such a con-
tract which thereupon becomes its own con-
tract, which may be enforced by or against it. 
Wall vs. Niagara Mining & S. Co. (supra). The 
rule is succinctly stated in 4 Cook on Corps. 
(8th Ed) 707, p. 2894: 'A corporation accept-
ing the benefits of the contract of its incorpo-
rators must accept the burd~n, and a promot-
er's contract which has been ratified or adop-
ted by the corporation, or the benefits of 
which have been accepted by the corporation 
with knowledge of such contract, may be en-
forced against it.' " 
Counsel cited cases which state only the general 
rule, namely, that corporation is not bound by a pro-
motion agreement. He does not refer to this excep-
tion to the rule which is discussed in the two cases 
which we have just quoted from. 
We have an almost identical state of facts to our 
case in the case of Balfour Guthrie & Co. vs. Breslaur, 
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90 Wash. 441; 156 Pac. 398. In that case an agree-
ment to which were subscribed the initials of the 
incorporators of this proposed corporation, mentioned 
that the debts of the former business were to be as-
sumed by the new corporation. However, the min-
utes of the new corporation did not make an express 
assumption of the debts. The court held that was un-
necessary and that the assumption of the debts could 
be implied from the fact that the corporation took 
over the assets, subject to the express promise to pay 
the debts of the former business. Since the provisions 
of Exhibit B became binding upon the corporation, 
there is a writing on behalf of the corporation suffi-
cient to meet the Statute of Frauds. 
EVEN IF EXHIBIT B IS NOT BINDING ON THE CORPORATION 
THERE ARE OTHER WRITINGS OF THE CORPORATION TO 
SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
Though counsel feels that we may well rest at 
this point on the proposition of showing that there 
was a writing sufficient to meet the statute of Frauds 
in the form of Exhibit B, nevertheless, without bur-
dening the court too far, we should like to point out 
the additional exhibits which would be sufficient if 
there were not an Exhibit B. 
Exhibit C is a writing by the corporation's own 
accountants and signed by them. It was admitted 
that Wells, Baxter & Miller, certified public account-
ants, were the agents of the corporation. The writing 
was subsequent to the organization of the corpora-
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tion.. The writing goes on to prove the complete per-
formance of the agreement by the corporation. The 
writing states that personal property assets of $56,~ 
163.33 (the total of the six items listed beginning 
with the one labelled "Accounts Receivable") were 
received by the corporation, as well as real property 
having a value of $136,646.57, or a total of $192,-
809.90. It also proves that the total amount of the 
liabilities paid out by Perry were $124,221.07 and 
that capital stock of $50,000.00 was given to Perry, 
or a total of $174,221.07, and it then states categori-
cally that the difference between the amount of as-
sets contributed of $192,809.90 and the amounts paid 
out for Perry's debts and his .capital stock totaling 
$174,221.07, or $18,588.83, the amount of the debt 
owing to Sher Khan was expressly assumed. This 
statement is found on page 1 of Exhibit C, in these 
words: " * * *account payable of Nielson & Perry 
to Sher Khan assumed by Perry-Zolezzi, Inc." This 
writing should also be sufficient to meet the require-
ments of the Statute of Frauds, namely, that an 
agreement to assume the debt of another must be in 
writing. See McConnell vs. Brilliant, 17 111, 354 at 
360; 65 Am Dec. 661, which states: 
''Any kind of writing from a solemn deed 
down to mere hasty notes or memoranda, 
books, papers or letters, will suffice." 
Exhibit D and G are writings sufficient. They 
are of the books of account of the corporation pre-
pared by the corporation's agents. 
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Exhibit D, an entry on the corporate books when 
the corporation took over the assets, specifically re-
cords that the credit accounts payable, Sher Khan 
$18,588.83, was entered (in the words of the ac-
countant): "To record receipt of assets and assump-
tion of liabilities of W. R. Perry." These are the exact 
quotes from page 3 of the corporation General Jour-
nal. 
Exhibit G, line 8, shows that there was a credit 
to W. R. Perry of $21,564.11 in consideration of 
"transfer of assets of W. R. Perry." This is the rec-
ordation on the account of W. R. Perry on the same 
General Journal entry (Exhibit D), showing that the 
corporation assumed liabilities of W. R. Perry. 
Exhibit H, a letter written by Perry-Zolezzi, Inc., 
dated November 29, 1946, is also a sufficient writing. 
That letter states: "We will not be able to pay Sher 
Khan on December 1st but we will be in a position 
to do so by January 1Oth." · This letter was written 
after September 21, 1946, upon which date the corpo-
ration_had acknowledged the debt of $18,588.83, by 
paying the corporate check in the amount of $3,588.83 
on the debt. 
"When the party sought to be charged 
has admitted the contract in writing over his 
signature, the statute is complied with no mat-
ter tp whom the writing may have been ad-
dressed." 27 C. J. 301. 
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EVEN IF THERE WERE NO WRITING THE AGREEMENT TO AS-
SUME THE DEBT IS ENFORCIBLE BECAUSE IT WAS A PROMISE 
MADE BY ONE WHO HAS RECEIVED PROPERTY OF ANOTHER 
UPON AN UNDERTAKING TO APPLY IT PURSUANT TO SUCH 
PROMISE. 
"33-5-6 PROMISE TO ANSWER. FOR OB-
LIGATION OF ANOTHER-
WHEN NOT REQUIRED TO BE 
IN WRITING. 
A promise to answer for the obligation of 
another in any of the following cases is 
deemed an original obligation of the promisor 
and need not be in writing: 
( 1) Where the promise is made by one 
who has received property of another upon an 
undertaking to apply it pursuant to such prom-
ise, or by one who has received a discharge 
from an obligation, in whole or in part, in con-
sideration of such promise." 
This section is a statutory enactment of the com-
mon law rule that where a promise is given to pay 
the debt of a.nother in consideration of the receipt 
of property, that the agreement need not be in writ-
ing. The common law rule is set out in the case of 
Feldman vs. Maguire, 55 Pac. 8 72 (Ore.). The plain-
tiff was privileged to make proof under the pleadings 
of either a written or oral agreement. See 27 C. J. 
378, N. 27, citing the case of Slingerland vs. Slinger-
land, 46 Minn. 100; 48 N.W. 605. The statement 
from C. J. reads as follows: 
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convey real estate, without· stating whether it 
was written or oral, and alleging also such a 
part performance as would take an oral agree-
ment out of the statute, is supported by proof 
of either a written contract or an oral one 
partly performed." 
We will not repeat the matter already discussed 
to show that the defendant received $18,588.83 worth 
of assets plus $4310.40 and that it promised to pay 
this note owing to the plaintiff. If the defendant 
corporation takes the position that the debts of the 
defendant had all been paid except this note owing to 
Sher Khan, then the book entries of the corporation 
(see Exhibit D) show that the corporation received 
assets of $40,152.94 in August 1946, in consideration 
of which it assumed and agreed to pay the note. We 
refer back to our discussion of this matter on page 
8 of our brief. 
EVEN IF THERE WERE NO WRITING ON THE CORPORATION 
BOOKS SHOWING THAT THE CORPORATION ASSUMED THE 
DEBT THE LAW WOULD IMPLY THAT WHERE THE CORPORA· 
TION RECEIVED THE ASSETS OF A PREDECESSOR BUSINESS 
THAT IT ASSUMED THE DEBTS OF THE PREDECESSOR 
BUSINESS. 
There is even a stronger case where there was 
no writing whatsoever, and even though the Bulk 
Sales Statute was not invoked under the pleadings 
in that case, nevertheless the court held that the new 
corporation had assumed the liabilities of the former 
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business. S·. & J. Supply vs. Warren (Qkla) 133 Pac. 
(2) 201. The court in that case held that the as-
sumption may be express or it may be implied from 
the circumstances. The opinion is brief and it fol-
lows: 
"A corporation organized to take over 
the business of a partnership or of an individ-
ual may assume the liabilities of the partner-
ship or the individual and thereupon become 
liable to the partnership creditors. The as-
sumption may, according to some authorities, 
be either express or implied. It may be im-
plied from the circumstances. 13 Am. Jur. 
Corporations, Section 1249; Lamkin vs. Bald-
win & Lamkin Mfg. Co. 72 Conn. 57; 43 A. 
593, 1042, 44 L. R. A. 786; Zeimer vs. C. G. 
Bretting Mfg. Co. 147 Wis. 252, 133 N. W. 139, 
Ann Cas. 1912D 1275. This court in Shirvin 
Operating. Co. vs. Southwestem Electric C., 71 
Old. 25, 174 P. 1069, 1073, 15 A. L. R. 1104, 
said: "A long line of decisions may be found 
wherein it is held that when a corporation is 
merged into or absorbed by another, which 
continues its business, and where there is no 
substantial change of ownership,_ nor in the 
kind of business carried on, then the new cor-
poration is but the successor of the former con-
cern, and is liable as such for its debts." 
See also, McCarthy vs. Liberty National 
Bank, 73 Okl. 275, 175 P. 940, 7 A.L.R. 137; 
Cunningham vs. Spencer, 111 Okl. 217,239 
P. 444; Burkholder vs. Okmulgee Coal Co. su-
pra. We are of the opinion that the case comes 
within the rule of a continuing corporation 
taking the place of, and the assets of, the for ... 
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mer unincorporated entity. There is no denial 
that A. M. Strange, president of the S. & J. 
Supply Company, ordered and received all the 
goods, wares and merchandise as manager of 
the particular organization at the time the 
purchases were made. There is no denial that 
the account has not been paid." (Italics ours.) 
We conclude the First Cause of Action is sus-
tained by proof of the writings to e_stablish that the 
corporation defendant assumed and agreed to pay 
the defendant; second, that even if there were no 
writings that there was a promise by the defendant 
corporation to pay this note, and that having received 
property of the defendant, Perry, upon an under-
taking to apply it pursuant to such promise, the case 
falls under the provisions of Section 33-5-6, U.C.A. 
1943, and, third, even if there was not an express 
promise to pay the debt, that the promise is implied 
from the circumstances of the case. This third con-
clusion follows from the case of S. & J. Supply Com-
pany vs. Warren, hereinabove discussed. 
It seems to us that we can conclude this discus-
sion on the First Cause of Action by stating that sub-
sidiary findings to which the defendant corporation 
ubjects are fully sustained by the evidence. The cor-
poration did pay $3588.83 on September 21, 1946, to 
apply on this note and the defendant, Perry, was the 
President and General Manager of the corporation, 
and had the authority to make the payment. It was 
so testified. The defendant pleaded lack of authority 
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on the part of Perry, the President and General Man-
ager, but not one word of evidence was offered in 
support of that plea; in fact, the defendant offered no 
evidence whatever. Upon the question of payment 
of the $3588.83 the evidence is that the corporation 
auditors and the stockholders holding 100% of the 
stock, knew of the payment and never made any ob-
jection to its having been made. 
REPLY TO FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
Appellant, the defendant corporation, contends 
that some of the properties transferred by Perry to 
the defendant corporation were not of the character 
of assets the transfer of which are subject to the pro-
visions of the Bulk Sales Act. Appellant lists the 
pr'operties which it considers to be in that classifica-
tion on page 59 of its Brief. Respondent disagrees 
with that listing and herewith submits the asset sec-
tion of the balance Sheet, Exhibit J, which lists all of 
the assets transferred by Perry to the corporation and 
their nature and character: 
''ASSETS PAID IN By W. R. Perry as per 
OPENING ENTRIES 
Item 1 Land .............. $ 6,455.00 
Item 2 Building ........ 93,800.94 
Item 3 Dwelling ...... 1,595.50 
Item 4 Furniture & 
Fixtures ........ 1,849.99 
Item 5 Machinery & 
equipment .... 32,945.14 136,646.57 
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Item 6 Merchandise 16,832.36 
Item 7 Supplies -------- 11,401.41 
Item 8 Accourits 
Receivable ·--- 26,768.74 
Item 9 Meter Deposit 50.00 
Item 10 State Insur. 
Fund dep. ---- 100.00 
Item 11 Prepaid 
Insurance 
----
1,010.82 
Item 12 Prepaid 
Freight 
------·-
310.68 
Item 13 Prepaid 
Taxes ............ 37.70 
Item 14 Prepaid 
Expenses 
---··· 
7.55 56?519.26 
$193,165.83 
We herewith list those assets which the corpora-
tion would admit are subject to the provisions of the 
Bulk Sales Act. They· are the following: 
Item 4 Furniture & Fixt ................. $ 1,849.99 
Item 5 Machinery & Equipment .. 32,945.14 
Item 6 Merchandise ·····---···-············· 16,832.36 
Item 7 Supplies ............................... 11,401.41 
$63,028.90 
E~hibit B stated that money to pay the debts was 
to be made available from the $80,000.00 received 
on the mortgage of the real estate and the cash of 
$50,000.00 (Ex. B. Par. VI quoted on page 9 of this 
brief.) This $130,000.00 was more than enough to pay 
the debts of Perry, exclusive of the Sher Khan debt. 
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They amounted to $124,221.07. The only debt of 
Perry outstanding when the above listed assets,· sub-
ject to the provisions of the Bulk Sales Act, were· 
transferred, was the one debt owing to the plaintiff 
Sher Khan in the amount of $18,588.83. The $63,-
028.90 worth of assets transferred was. three times 
more than needed to pay this debt. 
DISCUSSION OF APPELLANT'S POINTS 1, 2, 3 and 6 
H this court holds that the plaintiff has stated 
and sustained either its First or Second Causes of Ac-
tion, then the remainder of this brief becomes aca-
demic. 
At the beginning of our brief we mentioned we 
would discuss Assignments 1, 2, 3 and 6 after answer-
ing the Assignments of Error directed at the First 
and Second Causes of Action on their merits. 
We preface our discussion with some general 
statements concerning the doctrine of "Election of 
Remedies'': 
"It has been said that the doctrine is a 
harsh rule which is not to be extended and 
that it is to be applied by the court with a wide 
discretion in order that it may not be made an 
instrument of oppr~ssion." 28 C.J.S. 1058. 
"The purpose of the doctrine of election of 
remedies is not to prevent recourse to any rem-
edies but to prevent double redress for a single 
wrong." 18 Am. Juris 131, note 13. 
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Assignments 1, 2 and 6 are essentially the same 
and we shall discuss them together. In each of these 
Assignments the appellant relies on the same general 
proposition stating that: 
In the First Assignment of Error, "plaintiff seeks 
to enforce the contract in the First Cause of Action, 
and invalidate it in the Second Cause of Action," (as 
to first Assignment of Error seeR. 57 quoted at page 
2 of our brief) ; as to the Second Assignment of Error 
stating (App. Br. p. 35): "That by filing his First 
Cause of Action and by attaching funds of defendant 
corporation on the basis of a valid contract· plaintiff 
had elected to treat the sale by Perry to the corpora-
tion as valid, and that he had- elected his remedy in 
the case"; as to the Sixth Assignment of Error (App. 
Br. p. 74) "(He (plaintiff) is the one who seeks to en-
force the /contract in the First Cause of Action and in-
validate it in the Second Cause of Action." 
Appellant contends that the plaintiff has treated 
a contract as valid in the First Cause of Action and· 
that in his Second Cause of Action he has treated·the 
same contract as invalid. 
At the outset we assert that a complete answer 
is that in the First Cause of Action we refer to an en-
tirely different contract than the contract to sell and 
purchase that is referred to in the Second Cause of 
Action. The First Cause of Action pleads a contract 
that the appellant received property upon a promise 
to apply it to the payment of the respondent's debt, 
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and that cause of action is sustained by proof of the 
receipt of the property in the amount of $18,588.83 
that was set aside for the Sher Khan debt and the 
promise to pay the debt of the plaintiff. The Second 
Cause of Action refers to a sale and the transfer of 
assets of not only $18,588.83, but a transfer of all of 
the.assets of a seller to a buyer (this corporate defend-
ant), and on account of which sale the law imposes 
a duty to deliver a proportionate share of the purchase 
price to each creditor of the· seller. 
The two causes of action are based upon separ-
ate and distinct facts. In the First Cause of Action 
we plead the assumption of the debt and then proved 
the contract by which the debt was assumed and it 
was supported by the consideration of the transfer of 
the real property from Perry to the corporate defend-
ant. That is sufficient to permit recovery. The Sec-
ond Cause of Action may be considered to be proven 
by showing the transfer of the personal property mak-
ing the sale subject to the Bulk Sales Act, and there-
fore by force of statute the corporate defendant is 
liable for this debt. Thus, in the Second Cause of Ac-
tion, we need not prove or rely upon anything that 
was alleged or proved in the First Cause of Action. 
This view is supported in 28 C.J.S. 1065, which states: 
"The doctrine does not require an election 
between distinct causes of action arising out 
of separate and distinct facts." 
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In order for the causes of action to be inconsist-
ent, one of the causes must admit a fact an·d the other 
deny the same fact, not a legal conclusion. See Jaloff 
vs. United Auto, 120 Ore. 381, 250 Pac. 71'7, where· 
the following statement is found: 
"In order that an election to pursue one 
remedy shall preclude resort to another, the. 
two must be inconsistent. It follows that a 
person may pursue any number of consistent" 
concurrent remedies until he obtains satisfac-. 
tion from some of them. No estoppel by elec-
tion arises where there is but one cause of ac-
tion and alternative or different forms of re-
lief are sought." 
The latest Utah cases on the subject are: 
Kennedy vs. Griffith, 98 Utah, 183; 95 Pac. (2) 
742· 
' Commercial Bank vs. Spanish Fork, 153 Pac. 
(2) 547; 
Salt Lake City vs. Industrial Commission, 81 
Utah, 212; 17 Pac. (2) 239. 
See also Labor Hall Association vs. Danielson, 163 
Pac. (2) 167; 161 A.L.R. 1079. 
Where the law affords distinct but not incon· 
sistent remedies, the election to follow one does not 
operate as a waiver of the other. See Electrical Prod. 
vs. Haniotis, 170 Okla. 144; 39 Pac. (2) 36. 
"The fact that the plaintiff had previous-
ly attempted to hold the defendant liable as a 
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-party would not prevent a subsequent suit 
against him as guarantor of the same contract 
since one remedy was not inconsistent with 
the other." W. R. Rawleigh vs. Burkholder, 
50 Ga. App. 514; 1 S.E. (2) 609. 
Secondly, even though it be stated that the First 
and Second Causes of Action are based upon the same 
contract, the plaintiff in its First Cause of Action 
treated the contract as valid as between the seller 
and the buyer, and the plaintiff did likewise in his 
Second ·cause of Action, that is, treat the contract of 
sale as being valid as between the seller and buyer, 
adding only the entirely consistent allegation tltat as 
between the buyer's and seller's creditors, the con-
tract by force of statute was null and void. In both 
causes of action, as between the seller and buyer, the 
contract is treated as being valid. At no time does 
the plaintiff attempt to assert that the contract was 
valid between the buyer and the plaintiff, the credi-
tor. In the Second Cause of Action the allegation is 
that the contract is so far invalid insofar as it affects 
the plaintiff, and that allegation is in no wise con-
trary to a conclusion that the contract is valid as be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant. To sustain 
the Second Cause of Action it is necessary only to as-
sert the invalidity of the contract between the buyer 
and the plaintiff, not between the buyer and the 
seller. This view is sustained by the following cases: 
"The existing creditors who are not paid 
may attack the sale only to the extent neces-
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sary to collect their debts. They may not -in 
any other sense void it or set it aside." Dodd vs .. 
Raines, 1 Fed (2) 658. 
"However, notwithstanding the statutory 
provision that the sale shall be void, it is not 
a nullity. As against creditors of the se]Jer or 
transferors it is not void, but voidable in proper 
and timely proceedings, brought by creditors 
to set it aside and as is shown infra, Section-
485, that the sale is a violation of the statutes 
in no way affects the validity thereof as far as 
the immediate parties to it are concerned." 
37 C.J.S. 1327, note 93. 
As this last quotation shows, the Second Cause 
of Action does not attempt to plead that the sale .is 
invalid as between the parties to the sale. By force 
of the statute under such facts the sale is invalid as 
to creditors. Therefore, in the Second Cause of Act-
ion, the most that can be found is an allegation that 
the sale is invalid as to creditors. _ In the First Cause 
of Action, the most that can be found is that the sale 
is valid as between the buyer and the seller. Since the 
defendant's premise is that plaintiff in his First 
Cause of Action treated the contract as valid, and in 
the Second Cause of Action as invalid, there is no basis 
for the application of the doctrine of the election of 
Remedies. 
Thirdly, it cannot actually be said that the plain· 
tiff treated the contract as being valid or invalid in 
the Second Cause of Action. The plaintiff proceeded, 
in his Second Cause of Action, as the statute directs, 
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namely;· to disregard the contract. The remedy of a 
creditor under the provisions of the Bulk Sales Act 
is not set out in Chapter 2 of Title 3 which is the Bulk 
Sales Act, but for the remedy of any creditor as to 
whom a transaction is fraudulent is stated in 33-1-15, 
U.C.A. 1943 which reads: 
"Where a conveyance or obligation is 
fraudulent as to a creditor, such creditor, when 
a claim is matured, may, as against any per-
son, except a person for fair consideration, 
without knowledge of the fraud at the time of 
the purchase; * * * 
( 1) have the conveyance set aside or ob-
ligation annulled to the extent necessary to 
satisfy his claim, or 
(2) Disregard the conveyance and attach 
or levy execution upon the property con-
veyed.'' 
Thus, proceeding under subdivision 2, the plain-
tiff is not required to say whether the contract is 
valid or not; he is merely privileged to disregard it. 
See Flaks vs. DeBerry, 53 Wyo. 203, 79 Pac. (2) 825, 
116 A.L.R. 1191. The court states at 1194 of the 
A.L.R. annotation: 
"The right of the creditor to disregard the 
conveyance and attach the property presup-
poses that the title, for the purpose of enabling 
the creditor to enforce his claim, remains in 
the grantor. See American Trust vs. Kaufman, 
276 P. 35, 119 Atl. 749, Rutherford vs. Carr, 99 
Tex. 101; 87 S.W. 815; Bigelow on Fraudulent 
Conveyances page 464. The attachment gives 
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the creditor a lien which (at leait before the 
uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act). was nec-
essary as the basis of an action to set the con-
veyance aside. See Platte County Bank vs. 
Frantz, 33 Wyo. 326, at 336; 239 Pac. 531; 
Glenn on Fraudulent Conveyances, Section 
35." 
Therefore, in this case we have proceeded under 
the provisions of subdivision 2 of Section 33-1-15. It 
is important to note that the law does not say that 
the transfer is invalid. It only states that the creditor 
may disregard it. 
Fourth, the doctrine of Election of Remedies ap-
plies when a person who has sued in affirmance of a 
contract then proceeds to a contrary remedy, a re-
scission of the contract. The remedy provided by the 
Bulk Sales Act is not to rescind the contra.ct of sale; 
it is rather an affirmance of the contract of sale, and 
asks only that the proceeds of the sale be applied as 
the statute directs. Even though one cause of action 
would be considered to be in affirmance of the con-
tract and one in disaffirmance of the contract, we 
desire to point out to the court that the doctrine of 
Election of Remedies in such a situation applies only · · · · 
when the action i& between parties to the contract. 
Third persons who are not privy to the contract are 
not bound by ~he rule. See 28 C.J.S. 1076, Note 23, 
where the following quotation is taken from the case 
of Newmann vs. Guaranty Trust Company of New 
York, 276 N.Y.S. 873; 243 App. Div. 632: 
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"The limitation 6f the right to prosecute 
simultaneous actions in affirmance and disaf-
frrmance of contract, such as an action to re-
cover damages for fraud and action for money 
had and received, relates only to actions be-
tween the parties to the contract." 
In the Second Assignment of Error the appellant 
contends that by levying a writ of attachment against 
the funds of the appellant, the plaintiff elected to 
treat said conveyance and transfer of property from 
the defendant, Perry, to the defendant corporation 
as a valid conveyance, and has elected his remedy 
herein. 
This attachment was levied in April of 1947, or 
nearly nine months after the original conveyance 
from Perry to the defendant corporation was made. 
By that time the defendant corporation could have 
had other property different from that acquired from 
the defendant, Perry. Even if the attachment were 
made against the property originally transferred to 
the defendant corporation, still according to the case 
of Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company vs. Je-
rasik (1931) 235 N.W. 836; 254 Michigan 836, 
"The institution of an attachment against 
the property in question in another county is 
not an election of remedies which will prevent 
the plaintiff from bringing a suit in equity to _ 
set aside a quit-claim deed in a fraudulent con-
veyance." 
Though the plaintiff did not prevail for r~asons 
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with which we are not concerned in this action, the 
plaintiff in the case of Electrical Products vs. 'Smyser, 
143 Pac. (2) 452, proceeded with. both c~uses of 
action exactly as the plaintiff has done in the instant 
case. The court stated: , 
"The appellant contends that it was en-
titled to recovery, first, because the plaintiff 
agreed to assume to pay the indebtedness, and, 
second, because in making the transfer and 
sale the partfes did not comply with the Bulk 
Sales Law." 
In this action we have proceeded in that same 
manner. The defendant in the case just quoted from 
did not raise the contention here made that there has 
been an election of remedies. 
We respectfully submit that the doctrine of 
Election of Remedies does not apply for the four 
reasons which we have discussed. 
FURTHER DISCUSSION OF ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3 AS 
IT RELATES TO THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL 
We can do no more in discussing this Second 
Assignment of Error than submit to this court the 
discussion on the Second Assignment of Error that 
was contained, in our brief submitted to the trial 
court. The following is quoted from that brief: 
"At the tri«jl, counsel complained of the 
fact that Judge Ellett had stricken the first af-
firmative defense, wherein the corporate de-
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fendant pleaded that this plaintiff was estopped 
to claim a violation under the Bulk Sales Stat-
ute. First it pleaded that it had believed that 
the Sher Khan debt was paid in full by the 
time the transfer was made to it and that that 
belief rose from a representation of the plain-
tiff (See paragraph 1, page 4, of Defendant's 
Answer to Amendment to Plaintiff's Com-
plaint adding Second Cause of Action.) It 
also pleaded that the basis of the estoppel as 
against this plaintiff was: "That the plaintiff 
orally consented to the sale and that the plain-
tiff agreed with the defendant Perry that the 
plaintiff would look to the defendant Perry for 
the payment of said obligation from his per-
sonal· funds and would· regard said obligation 
· · as a personal indebtedness of the defendant 
W. R. Perry." Although the court generously 
stated that if such facts could be proved he 
would permit proof of them, the defendants 
offered no evidence of the facts which it con-
tended were sufficient to create an estoppel. 
We must of course assume that they have no 
such evidence, not only from their failure to 
adduce the evidence but from the fact that the 
written books and records of the corporation 
set out. contrary facts. However that may be, 
even if they could establish those facts it would 
not create an estoppel because it was not plead-
ed that the corporate defendant suffered a loss 
by reason of the alleged misrepresentation or 
t;hat it acted to its detriment on account of 
those alleged misrepresentations. It does not 
plead that because of these alleged misrepre-
sentations it paid the amount directly to Perry 
or that it expended the money in another way. 
The elements of an estoppel are clearly set out 
in the case of Barber vs. Anderson (Utah) 274 
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Pac. 136 at 1382. See also Cook vs. Cook- (Utah) 
174 Pac. (2) 434 at 436. The court there af-
firms the Barber vs. Anderson case and states: 
"To constitute an estoppel there must 
be conduct amounting to a misrepresentaoP 
tion or concealment of material facts; 
these facts must be known to the party 
sought to be estopped and unknown to the 
party who claims the benefit of the estop-
pel and who relying upon such conduct 
acted upon it to his loss. See Barber vs. 
Anderson, 73 Utah 357; 274 Pac. 136, 
wherein this court discussed the elements 
of estoppel. In the instant case there ~s no 
misrepresentation or concealment of any 
material fact known to respondent and 
unknown to appellant.'' 
So in the instant case, while corporate de-
fendant pleaded that it believed that the debt 
of Sher Khan was paid, it does not say that it 
entertained that belief because of a misrepre-
sentation of the plaintiff. Therefore, the very 
frrst essential element is lacking, namely, mis-
representation. 
Secondly, the corporate defendant cannot 
with good grace contend that it did not know 
that the debt of Sher Khan was unpaid. Its 
own books testified to that fact and its own 
records show that it had made a payment on 
that account. 
Third, the corporate defendant did not 
plead any injury to itself and so in fact the 
frrst separate defense was wholly insufficient 
t<? set up an estoppel and the court so held and 
therefore struck the first separate defense. 
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If that were not enough, the court in the 
case of H. C. Bay Company vs. Ridnour, 206 
S.W. (S.D.) 463 held that a buyer in a case 
coming under the Bulk Sales Act must comply 
with the statute and may not safely rely on 
the seller's statement that he has no creditors. 
On this point we also cite the following: 
"Good faith on the part of the trans-
feree will not excuse his failure to comply 
with the statutory requirements." Gal-
breath vs. Okla. State Bank, 36 Okla. 8070, 
130 Pac. 541." 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that the judg-
ment of the lower court should be affirmed. The 
· procedural blocks which the appellant seeks to set 
up lack substance. One judgment only was obtain~d 
on both causes of action and both causes of action 
were directed at the effort to collect only one debt. 
The corporation defendant by seeking a reversal of 
the judgment seeks to enrich itself at the expense of 
the plaintiff. This corporation defendant should not 
be unjustly enriched by this large sum of money and 
hence this judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WHITE, WRIGHT & ARNOVITZ 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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SCHEDULE NO. 1 (A) 
Balance sheet taken from Exhibit "B", peragraph 9, which sets out what 
the proposed balance sheet of the corporation was to show, namely, a 
net worth of $100,000.00, in order to meet the requirements of the agree-
ment, if the debt of Sher Khan were not assumed. 
-ITEM NO. 
ASSETS: 
1. Cash transferred from First Na-
tional Bank of Salt Lake City, after 
paying in full all outstanding lia-
bilities of the partnershiP-•--------------
2. Total cash and cash items to be de-
livered to First National Bank, 
Paragraph 6 hereof _______________________ _ 
3. Less: Liabilities (Paragraph 5 
hereof) -------·--------···----·----------------------
4. Cash represented by stock sub-
scription of Mr. Perry, Laverne 
Perry and Leonard Elton _______________ _ 
5. Land buildings and equipment .... 
6. Supplies and prepayments (re-
ceived from the partnership)---~----
7. Accounts receivable, supplies and 
other assets to be received from 
Mr. Perry out of his personal 
assets --------------------------------------------------
8. Unpaid balance of $50,000.00 note 
executed by Mr. Perry ................... . 
9. 
LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL: 
10. Note to First National Bank of 
Salt Lake City, secured by First 
Mortgage or deed of trust on plant 
and properties ----------------------------------
11. Capital Stock: 
Stock owned by W. R. Perry (in-
cluding stock held in names of La-
verne Perry and Leonard W. Elton 
as nominess) ------------------------------------
12. Stock owned by Stephen Zolezzi, 
(including stock held in name of 
L. W. Wrixon as nominee)------------
168,000.00 
164,000.00 
13. TOTAL LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL 
50,000.00 
$4,000.00 
1,000.00 
135,000.00 
15,000.00 
15,000.00 
10,000.00 
$180,000.00 
80,000.00 
50,000.00 100,000.00 
$180,000.00 
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SCHEDULE NO. 1 (B) 
Balance sheet to show what assets would be required to be taken over 
from Perry to give the new corporation a net worth of $100,00.00 as re-
quired by Exhibit "B", Paragraph 9, when the debt of Sher Khan was 
assumed. 
ITEM NO. 
ASSETS: 
1. Cash and other asets transferred to 
new corporation after paying all 
outstanding liabilities of the part-
nership excepting account of Sher 
Khan consisting of the three items: 
(a) Cash required by paragraph 8 $4,000.00 
(b) Amount reserved for Sher 
Kahn account ------------·-----------···· 18,588.83 (c) Amount paid in lieu of note 
\Jf ----------------------------------10,000.00 
plus: cash of________________ 1,000.00 
11~000.00 
less: paid in by 
equipment ---------------- 1.646.57 _ 9,353.43 
2. Total cash items and the equiva-
lent made available for payment .. 
of debts as per Paragraph 6 ___________ _ 
3. Less: Liability actually paid as p~r.. 
Paragraph 5 of agreement (see 
Schedule "C") ----------------------------------
-4. Cash represented by stock sub-
scription of Mr. Perry, Laverne--
Perry and Leonard W. Elton --------
5. Land, buildings and equipment 
(see Exhibit (" J") --------------------------
6. Supplies and prepayments ( re-_ 
ceived from the partnership)--------
7. Accounts receivable, supplies and 
other asets to be receive.d from _ 
Mr. Perry out of his personal as-
sets ------------------------------------------------------
8. Unpaid balance_ of $50,000.00 note 
executed by Mr. Perry ___________________ _ 
9. 
LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL: 
10. Note to the First National .Bank 
of Salt Lake City, seclired by First 
Mortgage or deed of trust on plant 
and properties ----------------------------------
11. Capital Stock: 
Stock owned-by W: R.··Perry (in..: 
eluding stock held in names of La-
verne Perry and Leonard W. Elton 
as nominees) ________________________ _. _________ · 50;000.00 
12. Stock owned by Stephen Zolezzi 
(including stock held in name of 
L. W. Wrixom as nominee -------------- 50,000.00 
13. Note due to Sher Khan----------------
14. TOTAL LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL 
156,163.33 
124;221.07 
. 31,942.26 
136,646.57 
15,000.00 
15,000.00 
$198,588.83 
80,000.00 
.... 1-00,000.00 
18,588.83 
$198,588.83 
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SCliEDULE NO. 1 (C) 
Actual balance sheet of Perry-Zolezzi, Inc., at the conclusion of the open-
ing entries. 
ITEM NO. 
ASSETS 
1. Fixed assets taken over by corpo-
ration (see Exhibit "]") ............... . 
2. Merchandise, supplies, accounts 56,163.33 
receivable, etc., taken over by cor- 355.93 
corporation from Perry (Exh. "J") 
3. Cash on hand ................................... . 
(For explanation of this item see 
Note No. 1 below) 
4. TOTAL ASSETS: 
LIABILITIES: 
5. First National Bank for mortgage 
in~ebtedness ..................................... . 
6. Owing to W. R. Perry on account 
of contribution of assets in excess 
of amount required as shown by 
Liability Section of Exhibit "J" .... 
7. Owing because of assumption of 
debt of Sher Khan ......................... . 
8. Capital stock 
TOTAL: 
136,646.57 
56,519.26 
9,733.40 
$202,899.23 
80,000.00 
·4,310.40 
18,588.83 
100,000.00 
$202,899.23 
Note No. 1: On the record (page 201), Mr. Duke testified that there 
was a balance of cash on hand after the formation of the corporation of 
"about $9700.00." Instead of accepting that approximate figure, counsel 
has prepared a tabulation from the record in this case that shows that 
the exact amount of cash on hand was $9,733.40 and we have therefore 
used that exact figure instead of the approximation made by Mr. Duke. 
The exact calculation is determined from the following facts 'mtroduced 
into evidence, namely: · 
Cash received from First National Bank on mortgage........ 80,000.00 
Cash received from Zol.ezzi for his contribution to capital 
stock -·········-··-········-················-·········································--~ 50,000.00 
Total available cash with which to pay debts of Perry:........ $130,000.00 
less: Debts of W. R. Perry actually paid by the corporation 
(see liability section of Exhibit "J") ................................... . 
BALANCE of cash remaining in the hands of the corporation 
120,266.60 
$9,733.~ 
NOTE: The top part of this computation shows that after giving 
effect to the transfers actually made, the corporation had a net worth of 
$100,000.00 which was the exact net worth contemplated by the promo· 
tion agreement. 
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